Spark

[Ethereum] Spark Liquidity Layer - Sentora x Spark RLUSD Force-Deallocate Penalty Update - September 14, 2026 Spark's Operational Facilitator has placed a proposal into the voting system on behalf of nested contributor Phoenix Labs. Review The Spark community can hereby express support or opposition to the following changes: Increase the force-deallocate penalty on the Sentora x Spark RLUSD vault’s existing Morpho market adapter from 0 to 0.01% (1 basis point). Required Context The Sentora x Spark RLUSD vault is an existing Morpho Vaults V2 vault onboarded to the Spark Liquidity Layer in the September 10, 2026 spell cycle. The scope of the deployment and onboarding context can be found under Item 5 in the September 10, 2026 spell technical scope forum post This standalone change uses the vault’s existing curator authority. The penalty is stored per adapter on the vault. The target is its sole registered adapter, also its liquidity adapter, MorphoMarketV1AdapterV2. The vault owner, curator, sentinels, and allocator permissions are unchanged. Sentora instance identifies the curator as a 2-of-2 Safe controlled jointly by Soter Labs (GovOps in the operating plan) and Sentora. GovOps will initiate the curator Safe transaction. Sentora’s signer Safe will approve and execute it after initiation. The on-chain caller of submit(bytes) must be the curator Safe itself. Proposed Actions If this proposal is approved, the Sentora x Spark RLUSD force-deallocate penalty will be set to 0.01% (1 basis point) with the following actions: 1. Submit the Penalty Change to the Vault’s Timelock GovOps submits the penalty change to the vault’s timelock, scheduling the approved increase with the vault’s required delay and cancellation window. GovOps initiates the curator Safe transaction through its signer seat. Sentora’s signer Safe approves and executes the outer curator Safe transaction. Parameter change: forceDeallocatePenalty(adapter): 0 (0%) → 100000000000000 (1e14, 0.01%, 1 bp) timelock(0x3e9d2ac7): 604800 seconds (7 days) → Unchanged 2. Apply the Approved Change after the Timelock After the timelock has passed (earliest on Thursday, September 24, 2026, at or after the exact UTC timestamp recorded by executableAt(data)), Sentora, as planned executor, applies the parameter change, provided the approved action remains queued. The seven days begin with the mined vault submission, not Safe proposal creation or the first signature. September 24 is achievable only if submit(data) is mined on September 17 after poll approval, at the corresponding UTC time. A later submission shifts execution by the same amount. Once mature, execution is permissionless and has no automatic expiry. If the poll is rejected, neither of the proposed actions is performed. If an unapproved or incorrect payload is nevertheless queued, the curator or a sentinel must call revoke(bytes) on the vault with that offending submission’s exact calldata before its recorded maturity. Withholding Sentora’s final signature alone does not cancel a mature vault action. Justification A nonzero penalty gives permissionless forced deallocation a cost, discouraging callers from disrupting the allocator’s chosen allocations. A force-deallocation of 1,000,000 RLUSD would incur a 100 RLUSD-equivalent penalty, paid by burning shares from onBehalf. The retained assets benefit remaining vault shareholders. Ordinary withdrawals and allocator/sentinel deallocate do not invoke this penalty. Recognition of retained penalty assets is subject to the vault’s maxRate accounting. See the force-deallocation implementation. --- For more details, please see the Technical Scope: Sentora x Spark RLUSD Force-Deallocate Penalty Update forum post The required Spark Artifact changes can be found in the following pull request: https://github.com/sky-ecosystem/next-gen-atlas/pull/338 Outcomes If "For" receives the most votes, the proposal will be approved. The associated pull request will be merged into Spark's artifact. When required, the listed changes will proceed to implementation by the relevant actors. If "Against" receives the most votes, the proposal will be rejected. No changes will be implemented.

SAEP-23: Update SubProxy Management Artifact Section - September 14, 2026 Spark's Operational Facilitator has placed a proposal into the voting system on behalf of nested contributor Phoenix Labs. Review The Spark community can hereby express support or opposition to the following changes: Summary The proposal recommends that Spark governance amend the Spark SubProxy Management section of the Spark Artifact to: Increase the Spark Product Backstop in section A.6.1.1.1.3.4.2.2.3 - Parameters from 1 million USDS to 5 million USDS. Deduct accrued but unrealized Spark Savings yield liabilities when calculating Current SubProxy Value in accordance with section A.6.1.1.1.3.4.2.3.1.1 - Current SubDAO Proxy Value: USDS held in the Spark SubProxy on Ethereum, less the USDS value of yield accrued on Spark Savings depositors' positions that they have not withdrawn. Realign the A.6.1.1.1.3.4.2.3.2 - Operational Process: calculate the value of the Spark SubProxy as of 16:00 UTC on the first (1st) day of each month; include the buyback transfer in the next available Spark proxy Spell with a voting date scheduled on or after the twenty-second (22nd) day of that month; and require the Buyback Executor to purchase SPK tokens through an onchain time-weighted average price (TWAP) mechanism over ninety (90) days in respect of each buyback transfer. The proposed amendments are limited to the Target SubProxy Value and Excess SubProxy Funds Disposition Policy documents, including their definitions, parameters and operational process. Background Current reserve and buyback policy The Target SubProxy Value is calculated in accordance with the A.6.1.1.1.3.4.2.2.2 - Evaluation Method and is equal to the greater of the Required Risk Capital (RRC) plus the Spark Product Backstop, or the Operational Expense Reserve. The following parameters are in effect at this time: a Spark Product Backstop of 1 million USDS, an RRC Lookback Period of three (3) months and a Target Runway of twelve (12) months. The Spark Product Backstop definition covers product risk exposures that are not covered by Sky’s Required Risk Capital framework. The Current SubProxy Value is set to take into account the Spark SubProxy’s Ethereum USDS balance without deducting the USDS value of yield accrued on Spark Savings depositors’ positions that they have not withdrawn. Spark’s Q2 2026 financial report already reflects such yield as a treasury liability. The proposed amendment would align section A.6.1.1.1.3.4.2.3.1.1 - Current SubDAO Proxy Value to Spark’s financial reporting and cause the calculation of excess value and buyback amounts to account for these liabilities. The Operational Process calculates the values immediately after Spark’s monthly settlement with Sky and directs the resulting buyback amount into the next available Spark proxy Spell. Its parameter record specifies a twenty-five percent (25%) Standard Buyback Rate, one hundred percent (100%) Enhanced Buyback Rate and two hundred percent (200%) Enhanced Buyback Threshold, with no absolute monthly transfer cap. The Enhanced Buyback Threshold is a percentage of the Target SubProxy Value, and the Enhanced Buyback Rate applies to the Current SubProxy Value from and above that threshold. Governance history and scope SAEP-06: SubDAO Proxy Management Plan, approved on November 27, 2025, introduced these policies with a 5 million USDS Spark Product Backstop. SAEP-09: Adjust SubDAO Proxy Management, approved on January 29, 2026, reduced the Spark Product Backstop to 1 million USDS and established the RRC Lookback Period, Target Runway and Standard Buyback Rate that are in effect at this time. A search of all eighteen (18) consolidated Atlas content files by target UUID, document number and defined-term variants found the affected policy references to be entirely within the Spark SubProxy Management section. The proposed amendments as outlined in the Proposal Details under 1 through 3 address the proposed amendments in their entirety, including the Current SubProxy Value note that presently refers to the most up-to-date onchain value. Proposal Details The proposal is for Spark governance to approve the following amendments to the Spark SubProxy Management section of the Spark Artifact: Amend A.6.1.1.1.3.4.2.2.3 - Parameters to increase the Spark Product Backstop to 5 million USDS. Amend A.6.1.1.1.3.4.2.3.1.1 - Current SubDAO Proxy Value to deduct the USDS value of accrued but unrealized Spark Savings vault yield liabilities when calculating the Current SubProxy Value and apply the valuation timeframe specified in the Operational Process. Amend A.6.1.1.1.3.4.2.3.2 - Operational Process to establish valuation of the Spark SubProxy on the first day of the month, the Spark proxy Spell voting timeframe, and the ninety (90) day timeframe for the Buyback Executor to execute the buyback transfer onchain through TWAP, while preserving the Buyback Executor's obligation to transfer SPK tokens to the Spark SubProxy. Justification The increased Spark Product Backstop increases the product-risk reserve input. Increasing the Spark Product Backstop to 5 million USDS increases the risk-capital branch of the target calculation while retaining the existing comparison with the Operational Expense Reserve. It may reduce the amount available for buybacks. Its adequacy remains dependent on actual exposures and the Required Risk Capital calculation and ongoing risk controls continue to apply. Deducting the accrued but unrealized Spark Savings yield liabilities when calculating the Current SubProxy Value reduces the amount treated as excess. The deduction recognizes yield already accrued on Spark Savings depositors' positions before capital is allocated to buybacks. Its amount depends on accurate liability measurement. Defining the deduction in USDS and measuring it at the same time as the Spark SubProxy's USDS balance gives Spark a consistent basis for the calculation of the Current SubProxy Value and subsequent Spark proxy Spell preparation. The monthly valuation of the Spark SubProxy Value and the excess value and buyback amounts on the first (1st) day of the month provides a common valuation time. A first-day valuation of the Spark SubProxy and a Spark proxy Spell voting date on or after the twenty-second (22nd) of the month separate the valuation of the Spark SubProxy from subsequent execution. The snapshot can become stale as balances, liabilities and risk exposures change. Spark's continuous capital obligations under A.2.2.10.1.1.3.2.1.2 - Primes' Total Risk Capital (TRC) Management, and its existing requirement to take immediate action on an excessive Encumbrance Ratio, remain applicable throughout that interval. A separate TWAP period spreads each buyback transfer's purchases across ninety (90) days. Execution over a longer period extends exposure to the Buyback Executor's custody, market prices and mechanism failures. The Buyback Executor retains responsibility for executing each buyback transfer to purchase SPK tokens and to transfer the purchased SPK tokens to the Spark SubProxy. A TWAP schedule does not guarantee a purchase price or eliminate execution risk. The retained Spark SubProxy and Buyback Executor wallet addresses match those listed in the Spark address registry at the time of this proposal. Their deployed contract code was verified through Etherscan V2 eth_getCode reads at Ethereum block 25,934,180 on 8 September 2026. Those reads are reproducible at that block and governance responsibilities are established by the cited Artifact sections. --- The required Spark Artifact changes can be found in the following pull request: https://github.com/sky-ecosystem/next-gen-atlas/pull/335 Outcomes If "For" receives the most votes, the proposal will be approved. The associated pull request will be merged into Spark's artifact. When required, the listed changes will proceed to implementation by the relevant actors. If "Against" receives the most votes, the proposal will be rejected. No changes will be implemented.

SAEP-21: Update Delegate Compensation - September 14, 2026 Spark's Operational Facilitator has placed a proposal into the voting system on behalf of nested contributor Phoenix Labs. Review The Spark community can hereby express support or opposition to the following changes: Summary The proposal recommends that Spark governance amend the A.6.1.1.1.3.1.3.6 - Incentives & Compensation section of the Spark Artifact to give the Spark Foundation sole discretion to determine Delegate compensation, subject to limits of USD 4,000 per Delegate per calendar month and USD 20,000 in aggregate across all Delegates for the same month. Background The current compensation provision was introduced by SAEP-05: Modify Delegate Framework and states: Active Delegates receive USD 4,000 per calendar month. The Spark Foundation administers compensation from its approved operating budget. Payments are monthly in arrears, prorated for partial months, and conditional on good standing and performance, with withholding or clawback available for non-performance or breach. The fixed amount limits the Foundation’s ability to reduce compensation expenditure when appropriate. Proposal Details If approved, the following changes will be made in the Spark Artifact: Amend A.6.1.1.1.3.1.3.6 - Incentives & Compensation to give the Spark Foundation sole discretion to determine compensation within both monthly ceilings, replace the historical startup dates with prospective notice and service-period treatment, and retain the approved-budget, arrears, proration, eligibility, clawback, and oversight provisions (Change 1). Justification The Foundation gains operational flexibility to reduce expenditure when appropriate. The amendment allows the Spark Foundation to determine compensation within defined limits as part of its existing budget administration. The individual ceiling limits compensation for each Delegate, and the aggregate ceiling constrains total compensation as the number of Delegates changes. The Foundation must manage both limits within its approved operating budget. Prospective notice preserves the treatment of service already provided. The Foundation communicates compensation and its effective date before the relevant service begins. Existing payment-in-arrears and proration rules continue to apply, and compensation for earlier service remains subject to the terms applicable to that service, including performance-related withholding and clawback. Compensation discretion reduces the certainty of a fixed stipend. This may affect Delegate retention and create perceived pressure on voting independence. Advanced communication gives Delegates the opportunity to assess the terms on which they serve. Delegates remain subject to their responsibilities, including vote rationales and conflict disclosure, and must abstain where impartiality is compromised under A.6.1.1.1.3.1.3.3 - Delegate Responsibilities. These controls remain relevant safeguards, while the possibility of influence through compensation remains a trade-off for governance to consider. --- The required Spark Artifact changes can be found in the following pull request: https://github.com/sky-ecosystem/next-gen-atlas/pull/333 Outcomes If "For" receives the most votes, the proposal will be approved. The associated pull request will be merged into Spark's artifact. When required, the listed changes will proceed to implementation by the relevant actors. If "Against" receives the most votes, the proposal will be rejected. No changes will be implemented.

SAEP-20: Update Risk Curation Framework Artifact Section - September 7, 2026 Spark's Operational Facilitator has placed a proposal into the voting system on behalf of nested contributor Phoenix Labs. Review The Spark community can hereby express support or opposition to the following changes: Summary The proposal recommends that Spark governance amend the Risk Curation Framework of the Spark Artifact to do seven things: Extend the framework's cancellation provisions to cover Morpho Vaults v2 instances, where the revoking role is the Sentinel rather than the Guardian and the vault owner cannot cancel directly. Add the Curator as an authorized canceller. Narrow the independence requirement defined in A.6.1.1.1.3.9.6.3.1 - Guardian Independence, permitting overlap between the Curator and the cancellation authority, provided the holder controlled by the Operational Executor Agent uses a separate signer set and at least one holder is fully independent of every Curator entity. The Sentora RLUSD Morpho Vault meets the amended standard and not the current one. Rename the Guardian role used in the framework to the Cancellation Authority, covering the Morpho Vaults v1 Guardian and the Morpho Vaults v2 Sentinel as a single role, state the conditions for removing a Sentinel role holder, and restate the reporting requirement in those terms. Add an Allocator instance parameter to the A.6.1.1.1.3.9.7.1 - Instance Parameter Definitions. Add the Sentora RLUSD Morpho Vault on Ethereum Mainnet to the list of A.6.1.1.1.3.9.7.2 - Approved Instances. Relabel the Guardian parameter as Cancellation Authority in the four existing approved instance records, so that every instance record uses the parameter name defined at A.6.1.1.1.3.9.7.1.5 - Guardian. Correct the contract address recorded for the Ethereum Mainnet Spark Blue Chip USDT Morpho Vault, which names a vault that has since been replaced. Background The Risk Curation Framework governs Spark's delegation of risk parameter management to third-party Curators, and the conditions under which pending timelocked changes made by a Curator can be cancelled. The framework's cancellation provisions were written for Morpho Vaults v1. In v1 the admin role that can revoke a pending timelocked change is named Guardian, and the Spark SubProxy and the Guardian each cancel directly. Morpho Vaults v2 differs in three respects that the current text does not accommodate. First, the role is named Sentinel. Second, revocation is restricted to the Curator and Sentinel roles, so the vault owner is not itself a revoking role and the Spark SubProxy cannot cancel directly; it instead exercises cancellation authority through a Sentinel that it appoints. Third, multiple addresses may hold the Sentinel role at the same time, whereas A.6.1.1.1.3.9.6.3 - Guardian Role was written on the assumption of a single holder. For details on the Sentora-curated RLUSD Morpho Vault into the Spark Liquidity Layer, please see item 5 [Ethereum] Spark Liquidity Layer — Onboard the Sentora-curated RLUSD Morpho Vaults V2 instance in the [[September 10, 2026] Proposed Changes to Spark for Upcoming Spell forum post](https://forum.skyeco.com/t/september-10-2026-proposed-changes-to-spark-for-upcoming-spell/28208). Proposal Details It is proposed that Spark governance approves the following changes to the Risk Curation Framework section of the Spark Artifact: Amend A.6.1.1.1.3.9.6.1 - Authorized Cancellers to add the Curator as an authorized canceller and to extend the provision to Morpho Vaults v2. Retitle A.6.1.1.1.3.9.6.3 - Guardian Role to Cancellation Authority, describe the v1 Guardian and the v2 Sentinel as a single role, and state the conditions for removing a Sentinel role holder. Replace A.6.1.1.1.3.9.6.3.1 - Guardian Independence with a requirement of a signer set separate from the Curator multisig plus at least one fully independent cancellation authority holder, in place of the current bar on any overlap between the two roles. Retitle A.6.1.1.1.3.9.6.3.2 - Guardian Reporting to Cancellation Authority Reporting and assign the reporting obligation to the acting role holder. Retitle the instance parameter A.6.1.1.1.3.9.7.1.5 - Guardian to "Cancellation Authority". Add a new Allocator instance parameter under A.6.1.1.1.3.9.7.1 - Instance Parameter Definitions. Restate the four existing A.6.1.1.1.3.9.7.2 - Approved Instances, relabelling the Guardian parameter as "Cancellation Authority". Correct the contract address for the Ethereum Mainnet Spark Blue Chip USDT Morpho Vault to the current Spark Blue Chip USDT Vault at 0xb0c424116172B55CbB6dD3136F5989F7959e5B91. Add the Sentora RLUSD Morpho Vault on Ethereum Mainnet as an approved instance. Independence is determined by Spark governance when the instance record at A.6.1.1.1.3.9.7.2 - Approved Instances is approved, on the basis of the holder identities recorded under A.6.1.1.1.3.9.7.1.5 - Guardian. A change to the Curator or to the cancellation authority holder set requires a further Artifact edit to that record. More details with exact changes for each of the above points can be found at the SAEP-20: Update Risk Curation Framework Artifact Section forum post Justification This proposal addresses the following points: The current text does not describe cancellation on Morpho Vaults v2. The rename removes a collision with an existing defined term. The independence requirement is narrowed. The Allocator holds powers the Curator does not. The existing instance records are updated to match. Please see the SAEP-20: Update Risk Curation Framework Artifact Section forum post for justification details. The proposed Spark Artifact changes can be found in the following pull request: https://github.com/sky-ecosystem/next-gen-atlas/pull/329 Outcomes If "For" receives the most votes, the proposal will be approved. The associated pull request will be merged into Spark's artifact. When required, the listed changes will proceed to implementation by the relevant actors. If "Against" receives the most votes, the proposal will be rejected. No changes will be implemented.