Uniswap Governance

View the proposal here: https://gov.uniswap.org/t/temperature-check-merge-the-uniswap-grant-program-into-uniswap-dao-governance/13511

Read the proposal HERE: https://gov.uniswap.org/t/consensus-check-abolish-delegates-and-change-the-uni-governance-voting-system/13458

View the proposal here: https://gov.uniswap.org/t/proposal-removal-of-established-cranial-follicles-fund/13314

tl;dr - Over the last 6 months, UGP has successfully deployed $1.75M to 52 grantees. While UGP was initially funded to deploy $750k per quarter, UNI price has appreciated and the multisig now custodies an additional $8.5m. This proposal seeks approval for the following changes: Extend the UNI Grants Program for an additional 6 months Utilizing the remaining funds, scaling the grants program up to $8.5M in grants All committee members to be compensated at $150USD/hr as needed for no more than 30 hours/week Due to time constraints, Robert Leshner, Kain Warwick, and Ashleigh Schap are stepping down from the committee, to be replaced by John Palmer, Ariana Fowler, and Callil Capuozzo

Would you like to have 100% protection against volatility for your crypto?? This could be done using the new Concentrated Liquidity of v3 by just changing or adding a few things! Imagine adding liquidity to the ETH/USDC pair for example (50% of each), and in case the ETH price drops and gets out of your range, your capital is turned 100% into USDC!! This way you would be 100% PROTECTED against LOSSES! And in case the ETH price goes up again and completely crosses your range in an upward direction, your capital would be automatically swaped 100% into ETH!! You could even manually FOLLOW or TRAIL the ETH price every time it goes up, by removing and adding a new liquidity range at a higher price, and this could help you MAXIMIZE YOUR PROFITS!! You could very efficiently trade tops like this! Just imagine trading perfectly the ETH TOP of this Bull market! Either if it is 10k, 15k, or 20k, you could just follow it and trade it perfectly!! And after it drops, you can continue to follow the price, GROWING YOUR CAPITAL thanks to a high yield from fees, and volatility itself! Knowing your capital is always completely PROTECTED against ANY LOSSES!! The problem now is that the direction of the swaps inside a liquidity range are exactly the opposite as they should be... Using the same example, if the ETH price drops out of your range, your capital is swaped 100% into ETH, and if the price goes up and gets out of the range, your capital is 100% swaped into USDC... It should be the exact opposite! So this is a PROPOSAL to change the direction the swaps are made inside a liquidity range to the exact opposite they are now, or to at least let the users choose the direction of the swaps when they add liquidity to the pools or create ranged orders. If we make this change, it would be DISRUPTIVE and Uniswap will completely BREAK all other DEXs and CEXs!! People would LOOSE the FEAR of loosing their money because of volatility!! This would easily help with crypto's mass adoption!! And it will definitely drive more LPs to v3!! Please think about it and support this proposal! Thanks!!

Should the Uniswap DAO becomes the first of many Ethereum DAOs to allocate a portion of their treasury (1.5M UNI) towards Ethereum client development, which is crucial infrastructure to the Ethereum ecosystem and is developed solely from public goods funding from the ecosystem [while also complex and requires specialized talent to build on], in hopes that others follow suit in correctly allocating the necessary funds to incentivize the talent needed to build complex open-source infrastructure? Full proposal: https://gov.uniswap.org/t/temperature-check-allocate-1-5m-uni-to-go-ethereum-long-term-talent-acquisition-retention-grant-geth-targ/13265

Raise the proposal quorum threshold from 40M because recent voting participation is much higher and there is a lot of UNI that has been delegated. Please vote for what you think the new quorum threshold should be set to.

Should Uniswap governance grant $25M to fund Community-Enabled Analytics via a sustainable yield-generating investment strategy that: 1. Produces analytics that educate the community and drive growth 2. Allocates UNI to participants through bounties 3. Uses Uniswap’s own yield mechanisms to sustainably self-fund the program Forum Post >> https://gov.uniswap.org/t/consensus-check-uniswap-funds-community-enabled-analytics-via-yield-generating-investment-strategies/13220

Uniswap should grant $25M to fund Flipside Community-Enabled Analytics via a sustainable yield-generating investment strategy that: 1. Produces analytics that drive user education and customer growth 2. Allocates UNI to participants through bounties, increasing liquidity 3. Uses Uniswap’s own yield mechanisms to enable a largely self-funded program Forum Post >> https://gov.uniswap.org/t/temperature-check-larger-grant-program-construct-community-enabled-analytics-no-negative-net-uni/13044

Raise the proposal quorum threshold from 40M because recent voting participation is much higher and there is a lot of UNI that has been delegated

Author: Feddas@Yam.Finance Forum Post: https://gov.uniswap.org/t/temperature-check-should-we-be-managing-systemic-risk-in-uniswaps-community-treasury-using-kpi-options/12624 Summary Problem Uniswap's governance treasury will retain 43% of $UNI supply vested over 4 years, currently allocated 113 million in $UNI. Current value ~ $2.724 Billion USD. Max drawdown starting on May 3 2021, in 20 days $UNI lost 71% of it's value, a loss of ~ $3.616 Billion USD. We need to manage this systemic risk and volatility for the long term success of the community treasury. Solution Partial divestment of Uniswap governance treasury by using UMA Synthetic KPI Options to create a win for the treasury, a win for the protocol and a win for the stakeholders. Long term goal would be to put together an actively managed portfolio for the treasury aka uniHOUSE. TVL Metric is only an example. There have been suggestions on using other metrics to measure the KPI for this option. It is currently an open issue which we can delve into more after the temperature check. TLDR: !https://s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/secure.notion-static.com/be190280-346d-46c8-beac-5d2827c06bf8/Untitled.png Background Yam.Finance Yam.finance has been leading the charge on treasury management for DAOs via our project DAO House: https://yamfinance.medium.com/yam-finance-presents-dao-house-86625f9bae5a We've realized that there are significant systemic risks for DAO's treasuries. During the bear market of 2017 multiple projects were forced to sell their treasury at historically low values, which ultimately caused many of them to disband and shutter. Treasury management is mission critical for DAOs, yet the challenges and complexities are formidable. Sushi realized this systemic issue and collaborated with Yam.Finance to build a custom treasury management solution called sushiHOUSE: https://forum.sushi.com/t/sushihouse-a-treasury-management-proposal/3106 The most difficult part of a treasury management solution for a DAO as large as UNI, is the first part, the treasury protocol token divestment. I present a novel solution that will benefit the treasury, the long term success of the protocol and also all stakeholders. UMA Synthetics A quick primer on UMA: https://docs.umaproject.org/getting-started/how-uma-works By using UMA's platform, we are able to use battle tested UMA financial contracts to create KPI options. Here are some examples of current KPI options that are already deployed and distributed. https://medium.com/uma-project/uma-kpi-options-and-airdrop-bae86be16ce4 https://medium.com/uma-project/badgerdaos-rebase-mining-kicks-off-now-using-uma-s-kpi-options-cd75f71dc1fa KPI Options How do KPI Options work? KPI options can be created by using UMA's battle tested UMA financial contracts. 1. Determine KPI metric for the synthetic. For example, KPI metric is Total Value Locked (TVL), currently ~$1.5b. KPI Metric could be many different things like volume, total fees generated over 30 days ect. 2. Determine target for KPI, value and expiry date. For example, we want to target 2x TVL start, $3b and want the option to expire end of 2021. 3. Mint KPI option by depositing collateral to be used at settlement. For example, collateralize 1 $UNI token for 1 KPI option. 4. For our example above: 1. TVL option starts at a value of .5 $UNI because current TVL is $1.5b 2. If TVL > $3b before the end of 2021, the TVL option can be settled for 1 $UNI after it expires at the end of 2021. 3. If TVL < $3b at expiry it will be worth a fraction of 1 $UNI. For example at expiry TVL is $2b, the value of the synth expires to 2/3 $UNI = .667 $UNI. 4. Synth is unliquidatable and fully collateralized. How do KPI Options divest UNI's community treasury? From example above, KPI Option is created by: 1. Collateralizing 1 $UNI token 2. KPI metric tracked is TVL, starting at $1.5b 3. Target is $3b TVL by the end of the year. If it reaches $3b TVL anytime before expiry UNI's community treasury is able to utilize its treasury full of UNI tokens to create these KPI options. 1. KPI Options would be minted by treasury and sold for stable coins via a gnosis auction or by various other means. Implied value of the option is .5 UNI (current TVL is $1.5b with target of $3b). 2. The sale would fund the treasury with stablecoins which could then be used to create a secondary market for the KPI Options by using Uniswap's AMM pools. 3. At expiry all KPI options could be settled and stablecoins withdrawn from LP positions. 4. Treasury now has stable coins = WIN! 5. UNI stake holders have incentives to increase TVL = WIN! 6. Stablecoins are the cornerstone of long term success for UNI protocol = WIN! Win - Win - Win Additional Details Yam.finance has extensive knowledge on building synthetics on UMA's platform via our development of degenerative.finance, V2 of site to be launched soon. Combined with our experience in DAO treasury management, it allows us to have a unique perspective to create this proposal. Links: https://claim.umaproject.org/ https://medium.com/uma-project/the-uma-kpi-options-airdrop-is-now-claimable-and-the-super-uman-campaign-is-live-7e9baa5c1669 https://medium.com/uma-project/badgerdaos-rebase-mining-kicks-off-now-using-uma-s-kpi-options-cd75f71dc1fa https://forum.sushi.com/t/build-kpi-options-with-uma-to-speed-kashi-adoption/3940 https://etherscan.io/token/0x1f9840a85d5aF5bf1D1762F925BDADdC4201F984?a=0x1a9c8182c09f50c8318d769245bea52c32be35bcc09f50c8318d769245bea52c32be35bc

Should governance allocate 1M UNI from the Community Treasury to fund a 501(c)(4) to defend the protocol and DeFi from legal and regulatory threats and help ensure the promise of DeFi?

https://twitter.com/ChrisBlec/status/1398655730979377155 Chris Blec has stated that he will leave the DeFi community for $50M. Let's get this done. 💪

Summary Problem Uniswap's governance treasury will retain 43% of $UNI supply vested over 4 years, currently allocated 113 million in $UNI. Current value ~ $2.724 Billion USD. Max drawdown starting on May 3 2021, in 20 days $UNI lost 71% of it's value, a loss of ~ $3.616 Billion USD. We need to manage this systemic risk and volatility for the long term success of the community treasury. Solution Partial divestment of Uniswap governance treasury by using UMA Synthetic KPI Options to create a win for the treasury, a win for the protocol and a win for the stakeholders. Long term goal would be to put together an actively managed portfolio for the treasury aka uniHOUSE. TLDR:  Background Yam.Finance Yam.finance has been leading the charge on treasury management for DAOs via our project DAO House: https://yamfinance.medium.com/yam-finance-presents-dao-house-86625f9bae5a We've realized that there are significant systemic risks for DAO's treasuries. During the bear market of 2017 multiple projects were forced to sell their treasury at historically low values, which ultimately caused many of them to disband and shutter. Treasury management is mission critical for DAOs, yet the challenges and complexities are formidable. Sushi realized this systemic issue and collaborated with Yam.Finance to build a custom treasury management solution called sushiHOUSE: https://forum.sushi.com/t/sushihouse-a-treasury-management-proposal/3106 The most difficult part of a treasury management solution for a DAO as large as UNI, is the first part, the treasury protocol token divestment. I present a novel solution that will benefit the treasury, the long term success of the protocol and also all stakeholders. UMA Synthetics A quick primer on UMA: https://docs.umaproject.org/getting-started/how-uma-works By using UMA's platform, we are able to use battle tested UMA financial contracts to create KPI options. Here are some examples of current KPI options that are already deployed and distributed. https://medium.com/uma-project/uma-kpi-options-and-airdrop-bae86be16ce4 https://medium.com/uma-project/badgerdaos-rebase-mining-kicks-off-now-using-uma-s-kpi-options-cd75f71dc1fa KPI Options How do KPI Options work? KPI options can be created by using UMA's battle tested UMA financial contracts. 1. Determine KPI metric for the synthetic. For example, KPI metric is Total Value Locked (TVL), currently ~$1.5b. KPI Metric could be many different things like volume, total fees generated over 30 days ect. 2. Determine target for KPI, value and expiry date. For example, we want to target 2x TVL start, $3b and want the option to expire end of 2021. 3. Mint KPI option by depositing collateral to be used at settlement. For example, collateralize 1 $UNI token for 1 KPI option. 4. For our example above: 1. TVL option starts at a value of .5 $UNI because current TVL is $1.5b 2. If TVL > $3b before the end of 2021, the TVL option can be settled for 1 $UNI after it expires at the end of 2021. 3. If TVL < $3b at expiry it will be worth a fraction of 1 $UNI. For example at expiry TVL is $2b, the value of the synth expires to 2/3 $UNI = .667 $UNI. 4. Synth is unliquidatable and fully collateralized. How do KPI Options divest UNI's community treasury? From example above, KPI Option is created by: 1. Collateralizing 1 $UNI token 2. KPI metric tracked is TVL, starting at $1.5b 3. Target is $3b TVL by the end of the year. If it reaches $3b TVL anytime before expiry UNI's community treasury is able to utilize its treasury full of UNI tokens to create these KPI options. 1. KPI Options would be minted by treasury and sold for stable coins via a gnosis auction or by various other means. Implied value of the option is .5 UNI (current TVL is $1.5b with target of $3b). 2. The sale would fund the treasury with stablecoins which could then be used to create a secondary market for the KPI Options by using Uniswap's AMM pools. 3. At expiry all KPI options could be settled and stablecoins withdrawn from LP positions. 4. Treasury now has stable coins = WIN! 5. UNI stake holders have incentives to increase TVL = WIN! 6. Stablecoins are the cornerstone of long term success for UNI protocol = WIN! Win - Win - Win Additional Details Yam.finance has extensive knowledge on building synthetics on UMA's platform via our development of degenerative.finance, V2 of site to be launched soon. Combined with our experience in DAO treasury management, it allows us to have a unique perspective to create this proposal. Links: https://claim.umaproject.org/ https://medium.com/uma-project/the-uma-kpi-options-airdrop-is-now-claimable-and-the-super-uman-campaign-is-live-7e9baa5c1669 https://medium.com/uma-project/badgerdaos-rebase-mining-kicks-off-now-using-uma-s-kpi-options-cd75f71dc1fa https://forum.sushi.com/t/build-kpi-options-with-uma-to-speed-kashi-adoption/3940 https://etherscan.io/token/0x1f9840a85d5aF5bf1D1762F925BDADdC4201F984?a=0x1a9c8182c09f50c8318d769245bea52c32be35bc Managing Systemic Risk in Uniswap's Community Treasury using KPI Options

Uniswap governance currently has a proposal submission threshold of 10M votes. Should this threshold be lowered?

Should UNI governance allocate 1-1.5M UNI to fund a policy operation to defend the protocol and DeFi from legal and regulatory threats?

Background Per andy8052 on the Uniswap forums: ...there is immense value in being available for swaps on every EVM compatible network. Since there is no liquidity mining, it is hard to make the case that multiple deployments will segment liquidity, and long term if this is an issue governance can flip the switch on liquidity incentives for the chains it desires deepest liquidity. In the meantime, not deploying to new and growing networks like Arbitrum and Matic just allows for other exchanges to come in and fill that spot. This could potentially eat into fees earned by governance in the future. Alongside this, it will help to grow the potential list of projects that can be built on Uniswap v3. Growing the public smart contract libraries interfacing with and using the v3 codebase will only expedite Uniswap adoption on all chains as the code and integrations become more battle tested. Arbitrum launches later this week on May 28th. I think it would be best to start a discussion ASAP around deploying the Uniswap v3 code to Arbitrum network. Next Steps Indicate your interest for Uniswap moving forward with a deployment of Uniswap v3 on Arbitrum, by (1) opening the Uniswap v3 license to include code deployed on Arbitrum, (2) allowing community developers to implement Uniswap v3 on Arbitrum.

The UNI Grants Program would like to double the Q2 budget to $1.5M in order to match the Uniswap Labs bug bounty program with $500,000 worth of UNI from the Committee multisig. Due to the price change of UNI, the funds are already available and will not require a formal transfer of funds from community treasury. However, as these funds were not a part of our original proposal, we are seeking approval via a 7 day time-bound Snapshot vote, after which UGP will act according to the majority vote.

A proposal for funding Uniswap ecosystem development with up grants from the UNI treasury. The mission of the Uniswap Grants Program (UGP) is to provide valuable resources to help grow the Uniswap ecosystem. A grants program is a by definition a subjective process that cannot be easily automated. So the proposal calls for a small committee of 6 members—1 lead and 5 reviewers—to deliver an efficient, predictable process to applicants. The budget proposed is: $750K (of UNI) per quarter Over 2 quarters The assumption is that $1.5M worth of UNI seems appropriate for an MVP, especially relative to the size of the treasury that UNI token holders are entrusted with allocating. More details and an explanation of the methodology that got us here are live on Discourse, and we are polling consensus before putting this to a governance vote — as soon as next week! Should UNI gov create a committee for grant funding? Please show your opinions!

Authors: @monet-supply @coopahtroopa Background: Uniswap’s genesis liquidity incentive program ended on Nov 17. The program distributed 20 million UNI to LPs over 2 months, split evenly between the WBTC/ETH, USDC/ETH, USDT/ETH, and DAI/ETH pools. This worked out to 2.5 million UNI per pool, per month. Benefits of UNI distribution to LPs: Ongoing incentives allows UNI to be distributed to those providing value in the form of liquidity The incentivized pools are likely to remain the most liquid DEX pair on Ethereum, providing a venue to trade against ETH at virtually any size with zero slippage. Reduced incentives prevents UNI from being distributed ‘too fast’, marked by all tokens being distributed before the Foundation’s four year vesting has passed. Drawbacks of UNI distribution to LPs: Ongoing incentives result in UNI largely being ‘farmed and dumped’ to earn yield. See ETH USD Yield Farm, Pickle, Harvest and Alpha. Reduced incentives means UNI is distributed slower. Incentivizing the same pools can be seen as choosing ‘winners’ by selecting WBTC as THE Bitcoin on Ethereum and favoring certain stablecoins over others. Proposed new distribution: Distribute UNI for an additional 2 months from the time this proposal is adopted and executed by governance, but at half the rate of the previous distribution (5 million UNI per month instead of 10 million UNI per month). Note that pool distributions were adjusted slightly from the previous temperature check process. Reasoning behind this adjustment can be found here. UNI will be distributed to the following 4 pools: WBTC/ETH - 1.67 million UNI per month, ⅓ of total USDC/ETH - 1.25 million UNI per month, ¼ of total USDT/ETH - 1.25 million UNI per month, ¼ of total DAI/ETH - 0.83 million UNI per month, ⅙ of total Please see the liquidity incentive governance plan document for full details and timelines. Consensus check question: Should Uniswap distribute UNI to liquidity providers per the specifications outlined above? Next steps: The previous temperature check process passed with sufficient support of UNI voters. The following consensus check poll is the second phase of Uniswap’s governance process. The snapshot poll will be live for 5 days. If the poll passes with a minimum of 50,000 UNI in support, this initiative will move forward as a formal governance proposal. Consensus check forum post can be found here.

Background: Uniswap’s genesis liquidity incentive program ends on Nov 17. The existing program distributed 20 million UNI to LPs over 2 months, split evenly between the WBTC/ETH, USDC/ETH, USDT/ETH, and DAI/ETH pools. This works out to 2.5 million UNI per pool, per month. Benefits of UNI distribution to LPs: Ongoing incentives allows UNI to be distributed to those providing value in the form of liquidity The incentivized pools are likely to remain the most liquid DEX pair on Ethereum, providing a venue to trade against ETH at virtually any size with zero slippage. Reduced incentives prevents UNI from being distributed ‘too fast’, marked by all tokens being distributed before the Foundation’s four year vesting has passed. Drawbacks of UNI distribution to LPs: Ongoing incentives result in UNI largely being ‘farmed and dumped’ to earn yield. See ETH USD Yield Farm, Pickle, Harvest and Alpha. Reduced incentives means UNI is distributed slower. Incentivizing the same pools can be seen as choosing ‘winners’ by selecting WBTC as THE Bitcoin on Ethereum and favoring certain stablecoins over others. Proposed new distribution: Distribute UNI for an additional 2 months from the time this proposal is adopted and executed by governance. Distribute to the same 4 pools, but at half the rate of the genesis distribution. This works out to 1.25 million UNI per month to each of the 4 covered pools (WBTC/ETH, USDC/ETH, USDT/ETH, DAI/ETH), for a total of 5M UNI per month, or 10M UNI total over the next 2 months. Please see the liquidity incentive governance plan document for full details and timelines. Temperature check question: Should Uniswap distribute UNI to liquidity providers per the specifications outlined above? Next steps: The snapshot poll will be live for 3 days. If the poll passes with a minimum of 25,000 UNI in support, this proposal will move forward to the consensus check phase. Details about the Uniswap governance process can be found here.

What do you think is the right amount of UNI tokens to be spent on the liquidity mining program in the following month?

Voting Delay is the period between when a proposal is made and when voting starts (and the delegation snapshot is taken). The current delay is 1 block. Should we increase it?

Details: https://gov.uniswap.org/t/retroactive-airdrop-excludes-proxy-contract-users-e-g-dharma-matcha-etc/1222 https://gov.uniswap.org/t/application-for-retroactive-proxy-contract-airdrop-for-projects-apps/3221